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In this paper we open up the topic of ethical corporate identity: what we 
believe to be a new, as well as highly salient, field of inquiry for scholarship in 
ethics and corporate social responsibility. Taking as our starting point Balmer 
and Greyser’s (2003) AC2ID test model of corporate identity – a pragmatic tool 
of identity management – we explore the specificities of an ethical form of 
corporate identity. We draw key insights from conceptualisations of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and social orientated theories of business. We 
argue ethical identity potentially takes us beyond the personification of the 
corporation as agent. Instead, ethical identity is seen to be formed relationally, 
between parties, within a community of business and social exchange. 
Extending the AC2ID test model, we suggest the management of ethical 
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identity requires a more socially, dialogically embedded kind of corporate 
practice and greater levels of critical reflexivity.  
 







Adam Smith taught us, over 200 years ago, that capitalism is driven by 
individual greed and company profit maximization.  But at the aggregate or 
system level, it results in a much wealthier economy where all its members 
benefit to varying degrees.  Essentially, Smith provided us with the social 
justification for a business system populated by firms whose dominant goal is 
to increase the wealth of its owners. 
  
Nonetheless, within our capitalistic system, there exists a small, but 
seemingly growing cadre of companies where social or ethical goals are 
preeminent or, at least, are on equal footing with the profit motive.  Perhaps 
the earliest prototypes of such firms can be found in the 19th century 
cooperative movements in Europe and the United States.  For instance, the 
Co-operative Bank was chartered in 1872 to provide capital to the members of 
the Co-operative Wholesale Society in England.  During the first half of the 
20th century, the bank deviated from its original charter and developed along 
conventional banking lines.  In recent years, however, it has reversed this 
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strategy and sought to revisit its original roots by establishing a social/ethical 
mission (Anonymous, 2003).  In other words, the Co-operative Bank has made 
a conscious decision to project what we choose to call an ‚ethical identity‛.  
  
There are a number of other firms with far different histories that have also 
established ethical identities.  Recent formulations include companies trading 
under the increasingly popular banner of Fair Trade, developments in ethical 
investment and even a concept of ‘authentic business’, which at an 
entrepreneurial level makes explicit a company’s core mission to go beyond 
that of profit-making (Croft, 2005).  However, if ethical identity is to be 
accepted on a general basis as something more than a marketing gimmick, 
and with it becoming an increasingly attractive facet of mainstream corporate 
activity, there is undoubtedly a need to better understand the nature and 
managerial implications of ethical corporate identity.  This paper represents a 
preliminary inquiry into this topic, and takes as its starting point Balmer and 
Greyser’s (2003) AC2ID test model of corporate identity – a pragmatic tool of 
identity management. Added to which, we explore the specificities of an 
ethical from of corporate identity, drawing key insights from 
conceptualisations of Corporate Social Responsibility and social orientated 
theories of business.  The argument we make is that ethical identity 
potentially takes us beyond the personification of the corporation as agent.  
Instead, ethical identity can be understood to be formed relationally, between 
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parties, within a community of business and social exchange. Thus, extending 
the AC2ID test model, we suggest the management of ethical identity requires 
a more socially, dialogically embedded kind of corporate practice and greater 
levels of critical reflexivity.  
 
 
Notions of Corporate Identity 
 
 
‘<corporations are always owed obligation to themselves to get 
large and to get profitable. In doing this, it tends to be more 
profitable to the extent it can make other people pay for the bills for 
its impact on society. There is a terrible word that economists use 
for this called ‚externalities‛’ 
 – Robert Monks (Corporate Governance Advisor), The Corporation 
 
 
 As legally defined, corporations are decreed to be a person in their 
own right, which has been a convenient social mechanism to allow 
corporations as their own entities to be liable for their actions. Such 
circumstance has certainly helped give rise to the concept of corporate 
identity, around which, over the past decade, a growing body of literature has 
emerged.  This concept was originally used by identity or image consultants 
and was essentially defined as the image the organization is trying to project 
to its target stakeholders and the way it presents itself to these groups.  
Originally, as used by identity consultants, the term was synonymous with 
corporate logos and related graphics.  Its meaning, however, was gradually 
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broadened to comprehend a more total picture of the way organizations 
present themselves to their sundry stakeholders – through symbols, written 
and oral communication, and behavior (van Reil, 1995).  The extension of the 
concept’s meaning, of course, allowed the consultants to expand their 
services. 
  
The corporate identity concept can also be found in the academic 
literature.  Some academic writers use the term in the same way as do the 
consultants (van Reil, 1995; Marwick and Fill, 1997).  Gray and Balmer (1998) 
suggested a more generic, but encompassing definition of corporate identity 
that opens up a promising new field (which includes the issues of corporate 
identity, image, reputation, and communication) to theory development and 
academic inquiry.  In this way, corporate identity has been defined as the 
reality and uniqueness of the organization.  Operationally, this is to say that a 
company’s identity can be discerned through identifying its business strategy, 
its espoused values and philosophy, its organizational culture, and its 
structure.  Thus, rather like the writing through the middle of a stick of rock 
candy, Corporate Identity ought to be in evidence throughout all aspects of a 
corporation’s activities, regardless of when and where you ‘cut in’ to look at 
it. In other words, Corporate Identity is the signature that runs through the 
core of all a corporation does and communicates.  Of course, unlike the 
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simplicity of the message that reads through a stick of rock candy, Corporate 
Identity inevitably requires constant attention and management.  
 
 Balmer and Soenen’s (1999) conceptual model of corporate identity 
begins in a pragmatic sense to map out the different aspects of an identity 
requiring management and alignment. They distinguish four discrete faces of 
identity:  (1) actual: the current structural, organisational and philosophical 
attributes of a corporation;  (2) communication, which is often described in 
relation to image and reputation, but importantly refers not only to 
‚controllable‛ facets of corporate communication, but also the ‚non-
controllable‛ means of communication, e.g. word of mouth and media 
commentary; (3) desired: referring to what corporate management wants it to 
be; and (4) ideal, which refers to what objective outside analysts see as optimal 
positioning, i.e. the responsiveness to external factors and pressures. The 
model helps go beyond often more pervasive corporate thinking which 
considers identity as a monolithic phenomenon. Instead the model suggests 
corporate leaders recognise the co-existence of multiple perspectives and 
pressures related to a company’s identity. Significantly, with respect to what 
we come to discuss with the concept of ethical identity, Balmer and Greyser 
(2003) extend the model of corporate identity (named as the AC2ID test) to 
include an aspect of ‘conceived identity’, which refers to ‘the perceptions of 
the company – its multi-attribute and overall corporate image and corporate 
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reputation – held by relevant stakeholders’ (p.17). Managing conceived 
identity, they suggest, is all about making judgements ‘as to which groups’ 
perceptions are most important’ (p.17).  
 
This paper considers the development of a model of ethical corporate identity. 
As such, one critical implication, against the typical view of the corporation as 
a distinct, bounded identity, is that the management of others’ perceptions 
can be just that, the management of others from the point of view of a single 
atomistic identity. Yet, if we understand ethics, by default, always to ask 
questions not simply of ourselves, but how we relate to others in the world 
around us (and hence why we might find ourselves in ethical dilemmas), we 
perhaps need to begin to consider more social, dialogical models of the 
corporation.   
 
Taken as a whole, the different faces of identity described by Balmer and his 
collaborators begin to help us consider perhaps four main themes or 
questions pertinent to the notion of ethical corporate identity:  (1) Who are 
we?; (2) How do we communicate our identity?; (3) How is our identity 
conceived by others?; finally, and most pertinent to our discussion here, (4) 
How are we to understand identity as a holistic phenomenon? A key theme 
common to these questions is the internal/external nature of a corporation’s 
identity. The actual identity of a corporation is described as current attributes 
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as shaped by corporate ownership, leadership, organisation and performance. 
At the heart of actual identity – to be asked by owners, managers, and 
employees alike – is the fundamental question ‘who are we?’ –  leading, no 
doubt, in compliment to desired and ideal identity, to the question of ‘who do 
we want to be?’. Crucially, as described by the AC2ID test model, these are 
questions posed as part of internal debate within company management and 
operations. Similarly, communicated identity – though asking the question of 
how to become identified by others – is directed from within a company, with 
perhaps the media as interpreters or translators of a company’s desired 
message. Conceived identity, on the other hand, relates to the external 
manifestation of a corporation’s identity, stemming from a company’s 
relationship and placement within wider public contexts. Arguably a greater 
shift towards the external articulation of identity is required with respect to 
any purported ethical corporate identity. Furthermore, since bridging the 
internal and external will inevitably lead to the need of an increasingly fluid 
model of identity, it is surely of considerable benefit to consider identity, its 
communication and conception in a more holistic manner.  
 
The important point stressed by identifying different aspects of identity is that 
there is no one single perspective, in fact it would be highly reductive to 
suggest otherwise. Balmer and Greyser (2003, p.16) pertinently note that 
‘corporate leadership should recognize that multiple identities can co-exist 
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within a company even if they are slightly different’.  However, in going a 
little further, the argument we establish in consideration of the notion of 
ethical corporate identity is that we need to re-evaluate the grounds of the 
terms we are using, to attempt a further holistic consideration that places the 
corporation within a relational, networked system of meanings, values and 
identities. As we go on to consider, the varying phases of corporate social 
responsibility and social orientated theories of business (notably here 
stakeholder theory) can aid us in bridging matters of ethics with the insights 
of Balmer and Greyser’s AC2ID test model of corporate identity.  
Interestingly, in the concluding line of Balmer and Greyser’s (2003, p.27) 
article outlining the model, they suggest ‘*t+he ultimate guardians and 
managers of corporate identity reside in the boardroom’.  If there is one 
underlying, foundational point raised in our discussion here on ethical 
corporate identity, it is to challenge this statement, not so as to undermine it, 
but to extend our thinking, to ask how the management of corporate identity 
is connected to a wider sphere of influences and actions.  
 
 
Placing Ethical Corporate Identity (vis-à-vis models of CSR and 
Stakeholder Theory)  
 
At first look, perhaps, the turn towards ethical corporate identities 
perhaps need not mean any real adjustment from how we conceptualise 
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corporate identity more generally. Indeed, ethical identity has been 
successfully actualised by numerous companies, generally being a constituent 
component of what they actually trade in. So, for example, companies such as 
Innocent (fruit drink company), Cafédirect, Triodos Bank, Co-Operative Bank, 
Green & Black’s (Organic fair trade chocolate) and clothing companies Hug 
and Howies, all define, organise and structure their business in terms specific 
to their ethical interests and, furthermore, make this a part of how they then 
position themselves in the marketplace. As Clark (2006) has argued, the food 
and drink sector has been particularly successful in developing brands with a 
strong ethical identity, in this case usually placing emphasis upon quality and 
provenance of produce.  However, in ‘going ethical’ – in being very explicit 
about ethical practice – there is perhaps an argument to be made that a 
company’s communicated identity is evermore significant. Indeed it is likely 
that non-controllable communication is in need of increased attention. When 
recently, for example, the cosmetics giant L’Oréal bought up the Body Shop, a 
brand famed for its ethical stance, it was inevitable that media attention 
would bring to the fore questions regarding the wisdom of the acquisition 
and that dissenting voices would be heard from various animal rights groups. 
The PR machines were no doubt working hard the day of the handover, 
ensuring the high visibility in media reports of the original founder and 
spokesperson for the Body Shop, Dame Anita Roddick.  
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L’Oréal’s acquisition of the Body Shop (and the generous price they 
paid for it) is symptomatic of a trend in the mainstreaming of ethical 
businesses. However, it is equally significant in this case, when considering 
the specifies of ethical identity, L’Oréal were quick to point out there were no 
plans to merge with the Body Shop; instead it was declared the brand is to 
remain a standalone business. So, what is at stake in owning and maintaining 
an ethical identity – what is it that makes them different?  To shed some light 
on this question it is helpful to reflect on the changing conceptualisations (and 
fortunes) of CSR. Maignan and Ferrell (2004) provide a cogent overview of the 
various perspectives on CSR, dating back to 1950s. In its earliest 
manifestation, CSR is characterised by a sense of social obligation; ‘to follow 
those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values 
of our society’ (Bowen, 1953, p.6). Carroll (1979) later develops this idea with 
a model of different types of CSR, to include: economic responsibility, legal 
and ethical responsibility, and philanthropic responsibility.  From their 
inception, corporations have always held a responsibility to stay in business, 
i.e. to be economically sound. In addition, of course, corporations are legally 
required to comply with existing laws and to acknowledge social values and 
norms (to respond to what society expects of them).   
Ethical responsibilities of a corporation concern what is right, just and fair, 
but which are not necessarily bound up with any existing legal framework; 
responsibilities, then, which arise from specific cultural contexts. 
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Philanthropic responsibility, however, arises out of a specific philosophical, 
ethical tradition, being concerned with what is good for a society as a whole, 
and seemingly provides a mechanism for corporations to help improve the 
quality of life for different (and often underprivileged) parties and 
communities in the society.  
 
Part of the challenge of ethical identity, however, has been to move on 
from philanthropic activity, which it can be argued has come to be viewed as 
‘a paternalistic expression of corporate power’ (Swanson, 1995, p.50). More 
generally, with society in the late 20th century having become much more 
fragmented, though also arguably far more equitable, Maignan and Ferrell 
(2004) note how the notion of social obligation has been seen to be too broad a 
notion to promote effective CSR management.   Thus, from the mid-1990s, a 
more tailored definition of corporate responsibility emerged, to suggest 
‘businesses are not responsible toward society as a whole but only toward 
those who directly or indirectly affect or are affected by the firm’s activities’ 
(Maignan and Ferrell, 2004, p.4). This has been to mark a shift from social to 
stakeholder obligation. Drawing on the work of Henriques and Sadorky 
(1999), Maignan and Ferrell (2004) suggest four main catergories of 
stakeholder: (a) organisational (to include employees, customers, 
shareholders, suppliers etc.); (b) community (e.g. local residents and interest 
groups); (c) regulatory bodies; and (d) media stakeholders.  Clearly, while 
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corporations need not be considered responsible to society as a whole, 
stakeholder obligations are nevertheless extensive and bring into focus 
numerous and varied concerns, as well as potential conflicts.  
 
Whilst there is actually no single definitive theory of the stakeholder, 
‘each version generally stands for the same principle, namely that 
corporations should heed the needs, interests, and influence of those affected 
by their policies and operations’ (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, p.137). For 
advocates of social responsibility, stakeholder theory has been of particular 
interest, since it has enabled a re-definition of how business relates to society. 
Thus, against the traditional economic view, which considers the corporation 
to relate to society only through the marketplace, with stockholders the 
primary, if not the only stakeholders of importance, following stakeholder 
theory a more even view is taken, with stockholders becoming only one 
among various stakeholders. As a consequence of which, the very purpose of 
a firm theoretically shifts ‘to serve and coordinate the interests of its various 
stakeholders, and it is the moral obligation of the firm’s managers to strike an 
appropriate balance among stakeholder interests in directing the activities of 
the firm’ (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, p.138). Inevitably this presents all 
sorts of ramifications for notions of identity.  
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Thus, in relating stakeholder theory to a more specific interest in 
ethical corporate identity, the aspect of conceived identity noted in Balmer 
and Greyser’s (2003) work not only helps bring to the fore the importance of a 
company’s external face, but more significantly alerts us to the idea that one’s 
identity need not always be neatly ‘located’ within the company. In other 
words corporate identity – rather like individual identity – can not be said to 
be solely based in some core essential entity that simply emits its distinctive 
character. Instead identity is formed as much in the mirror of another’s 
perceptions, with this reflection being as much an influencing factor in how a 
corporation behaves and asserts its identity.  Wicks et al. (1994) feminist 
reinterpretation of stakeholder theory – which draws upon a trope of ‘caring’ 
– leads towards a definition of the corporation as made up of a web of 
relations among stakeholders, suggesting that internal/external distinctions 
then fade. Fundamentally, Wicks et al (1994) urge for a new definition of the 
corporation (and indeed of the self) that is based upon its relational nature, 
and not some essentialist or atomistic principle.  
 
As Buchholz and Rosenthal (2005, p.144) explain, shifting to a 
relational understanding of managing for stakeholders does not mean to say 
competition then becomes irrelevant, though perhaps it does becomes 
something of a secondary virtue. Instead, ‘*a+ firm becomes competitive as an 
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effect of successful collaboration and team work’, which in turn is to suggest a 
change in the ‚logical place‛ of competition in any network:    
 
While a firm must be able to compete to survive, survival requires 
growth, growth requires enhancement of a relational web, and the 
direction growth takes evolves through the self-direction of the 
firm’s community dynamics. Moreover, community growth cannot 
be measured in economic terms alone, because it involves the 
enrichment of human life in its entirety. The moral meaning of the 
firm is rooted in the community dynamics by which life thrives 
and in which the experience of value and its furtherance emerges 
(Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, p.145).  
 
Acknowledgement of this kind of thinking – of understanding business 
strategy as part of a relational network – has arguably been in evidence with a 
group of high profile British companies recently brought together by the 
Prince of Wales' Business and Environment Programme.  The group, which 
included executives from Shell, Tesco, Vodafone, BAA and Standard 
Chartered Bank, held a meeting with the British Prime Minister (in June 2005) 
to urge more restrictions are set with regards to carbon dioxide emissions, 
suggesting, for example, the need for tougher regulations on low-energy 
homes and products. As part of the thinking behind their request is the idea 
that growth requires enhancement of matters beyond the economic. The 
group claim, for example, that developing countries will not take climate 
change seriously unless countries like the UK show how it can be tackled.1  
                                                 
1 Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5050774.stm> 
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However, stakeholder theory is certainly not without its problems.  As 
part of Maignan and Ferrell’s (2004) overview of the conceptualisations of 
CSR, they suggest the need to look beyond both social and stakeholder 
obligations. Not least because, ‘the view of CSR as an obligation fails to 
provide normative criteria to evaluate the extent to which actual business 
practices can or cannot be considered as socially responsible’ (p.4, emphasis 
added). How, for example, can we evaluate the delegation noted above, who 
took it upon themselves to urge the British government for stiffer 
environmental sanctions? On what basis and due to what kinds of 
motivations has this group of notable companies made sense of the complex 
issues at stake? In trying to examine and define the concept of ethical identity, 
Stakeholder theory presents us with a certain blind-spot, since the theory 
depends very much on how you define the corporate entity in the first place. 
In fact, whilst stakeholder theory has sought to ‘correct’ the traditional 
economic view of the corporation as solely premised upon the interests of its 
stockholders, all too frequently it ‘remains rooted in the same atomistic 
individualism that pervades traditional economic theory’ (Buchholz and 
Rosenthal, 2005, p.146). Thus, stakeholder theory does not readily extend the 
view beyond that which maintains the corporation as an autonomous agent, 
that ‘the basic identity of the firm is defined independent of, and separate 
from, its stakeholders’ (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, p.138).  
  17 
 
The root of the problem is perhaps that the concept and role of the 
stakeholder, whilst widely adopted, remains ‘fuzzy’; leading Antonacopoulou 
and Méric  (2005), for example, to suggest we need to look past its ‘scientific’ 
applicability and begin to look more closely at its ideological assumptions. As 
they explain, their critique does not aim to ‘dismiss the possibilitiy that 
stakeholder theory as an ideology of caring relationships and 
interdependencies would add value’ (p.30). Nevertheless, they take issues 
with the fact that stakeholder theory – no doubt like theories of CSR and 
Corporate Identity – can too readily be considered to be value free.  Thus 
mirroring what Maignan and Ferrell (2004) observe as a more recent ‘ethics-
driven’ view of CSR (that takes its bearings direct from philosophical debate 
and theory), Wicks et al. (1994) interpretations vis-à-vis feminist theory and 
Buchholz and Rosenthal’s (2005) consideration of social pragmatism present 
useful relational philosophies which help to critique (and decentre) the notion 
of the responsible corporate entity (or agent). As a result, we can  begin to 
conceptualise the corporation as intricately bound up in and with community, 
so like the individual, is ‘neither an isolatable discrete element in, nor an 
atomic building block of, a community’ (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005, 
p.143). A question remains as to how we can understand such ideas to be 
opertionalised in terms of ethical corporate identity.  
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The notion of a decentred, relational identity need not at all be 
considered a necessarily contemporary configuration. In Aristotle’s writings, 
for example, there is a clear sense of the self as being inseparable from their 
surroundings – and importantly as necessary for the make-up of a moral 
person. The Greek word for someone uninterested in public life is translated 
as ‘idiot’, from which we get the word ‘idiosyncratic’ – i.e. to hold only to 
one’s own sense of self. By contrast the Greek democrat was someone who 
belonged to the city, i.e. was a citizen (McAfee, 2000, p.3): 
 
‘The city-state is also prior in nature to the household and to 
each of us individually, since a whole is necessarily prior to its 
parts. For if the whole body is dead, there will no longer be a foot 
or a hand < Anyone who cannot form a community with others, 
or who does not need to because his is self-sufficient, is not part of 
a city-state – he is either a beast or a god’ (Aristotle, 1998, 4-5). 
 
Aristotle’s explanation of the good citizen clearly relates well to the ideas 
noted above for corporate identity to come through a network of relations; 
and surely it opens up an interesting avenue for research over the concept of 
corporate citizenship. Specific to our discussion of ethical corporate identity, 
and to further this need to apply greater scrutiny to the concepts of CSR, 
ethics and stakeholders, we might usefully keep in mind the importance of 
the philosophic tradition that Aristotle is placed within. The practice of 
philosophy is to be critically engaged in the world, to test ideas to their limits, 
indeed to offer continual critique. It is this ability in critical reflexivity that 
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Antonacopoulou and Méric  (2005) argue must to be at the centre of any 
consideration of theories such as stakeholder theory; and in order that: 
‘<greater conscientization on the values underlying knowledge production 
processes in management and organization studies can lead to more insight 
and pragmatic representations of these complex and multifaceted aspects of 
social relations that stakeholder theory [as with other socially-oriented 
theories are+ committed to address’ (p.31).  
 
Similarly, as alluded to above, critics of social and stakeholder 
obligations models of CSR advocate what Maignan and Ferrell (2004) describe 
as an ‘ethics-driven view of CSR’.   In which case, the practice of CSR is based 
more specifically upon deeper philosophical debates of justice-based ethics, 
so, for example, allowing a company to ‘attempt to systematically favour 
decisions and procedures that stimulate equality, liberty, and fairness of 
opportunity for its various partners and associates’ (p.4).  
 
Just how greater critical reflexivity can be achieved in the corporate 
environment remains a rather open question. Perhaps, like the anthropologist 
who comes in from the outside as a critical observer, but who nonetheless 
seeks to meld with the crowd, corporations need to employ critical thinkers, 
who are then left free to roam (and interact) with their own agendas.  
However, to focus upon current managerial contexts, and to return to Balmer 
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and Greyser’s (2003) model of corporate identity (specifically designed as a 
tool for managerial decision-making), there are various considerations and 
recommendations that can likely be made. Based upon the above 
considerations of CSR and Stakeholder Theory, we are certainly led towards 
an interesting, and perhaps even a radical, model of corporate ethical identity.  
Crucially, if we again remind ourselves of Balmer and Greyser’s (2003, p.27) 
line that ‘*t+he ultimate guardians and managers of corporate identity reside 
in the boardroom’, we need to ask more concretely how such guardians 
actually seek to connect (and be seen to connect) with their externalities. 
Certainly we would want to agree, as Balmer and Greyser also note in their 
concluding remarks, that ‘regular identity reviews warrant a place on the 
senior management’s agenda’ (p27).  As difference of emphasis, however, it 
might be pertinent to remind ourselves – and by the same token to remind 
managers - that when it comes to the domains of ethics, we can’t always been 
seen to be setting the agenda. Ethics is a matter between parties, not for one 
party to bestow upon another. The task, then, for the corporation is somehow 
to capture for practical ends this relational process and interchange that ethics 
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Crucially, ethical identity would seem to go beyond the problem of 
personification that rather besets any view of the corporation as having 
agency. Instead, ethical identity is seen to be formed relationally, between 
parties, within a community of business and social exchange; though 
ostensibly to be managed through new levels of critical reflexivity on the 
behalf of a corporation. At present, we perhaps best need to see the 
relationship between CSR and Corporate Identity as opening up an important 
new area for future research. In fact, arguably, there is perhaps no such thing 
as ethical corporate identity, but instead ethical identifications (or 
preferences) that are expressed and reflected upon between stakeholders. In 
other words, ethical identity – if we were to ‘place’ it within Balmer and 
Greyser’s (2003) model of corporate identity – is formed externally, or 
relationally between points, with conceived identity a significant element 
affecting its configuration and maintenance. Thus, if ask the question head-
on, ‘What is Ethical Identity?’, it is certainly the case that ethical identity is not 
simply the stating of (and even following through with) ethical values and 
principles in a corporate mission statement, or a code of ethics. Instead, 
corporations are identified as being ethical by their social connectedness, 
critical reflexivity and responsiveness. Alignment between actual, desired, 
communicated, ideal and conceived identity becomes ever more critical, but 
more crucially still, not as to define an atomistic identity of a single corporate 
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agent, but rather to identify a more socially, dialogically embedded kind of 
corporate practice.   
 
More work undoubtedly needs to be done to determine properly how the 
AC2ID test model – as a pragmatic tool of corporate managers – can be 
operationalised within the extended, more fluid framework we consider here 
of ethical corporate identity.  If there is a specific sticking point it perhaps 
relates to the dimension of actual identity, which arguably is framed in overly 
static terms, as a snapshot, as it were, of a corporation as a whole. It is not to 
suggest that such moments of actualisation are not in evidence, but in 
extending the model to ethical corporate identity – and with the hope to 
sharpen further the AC2ID test model – it would perhaps be more pertinent to 
view actual identity as only single moments in a far more complex series of 
exchanges. Undoubtedly, like the photo-journalist’s dramatic freeze-frame of 
a ‘moment of truth’, actual identity can be both convincing and appealing – 
indeed an important driver for ethical leadership.  Yet, like the still image, we 
have to remember all kinds of contributing (and even conflicting) action goes 
on in and around the frame before and after any one single image is held.  In 
philosophical terms – which, following the ethics-driven view of CSR, we 
may rightful indulge in – there is at stake a difference between being and 
becoming (or doing): A difference, then, between simply asserting a corporate 
identity and actually sharing (even living) an ethical corporate identity.  
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